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ESSAY

MANDATORY EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION: KEEPING IT FAIR,
KEEPING IT LAWFUL
Theodore J. St. Antoinet

INTRODUCTION

President Obama's election and the Democrats' takeover of
Congress, including what was their theoretically filibuster-proof
majority in the Senate, have encouraged organized labor and other
traditional Democratic supporters to make a vigorous move for some
long-desired legislation. Most attention has focused on the Employee
Free Choice Act (EFCA).1 As initially proposed, the EFCA would
enable unions to get bargaining rights through signed authorization
cards rather than a secret-ballot election,2 and would provide for
the arbitration of first-contract terms if negotiations fail to produce
an agreement after four months.3 The EFCA would apply to the
potentially organizable private-sector working population; at their

t James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. This
Essay is an expanded version of the Rush McKnight Labor Law Lecture, which was delivered
on November 19, 2009 at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Much of the
research for this Essay was derived from an earlier article by Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration:Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008).
1 S. 560, H.R. 1490, 111 th Cong. (2009).
2 Id. § 2(a).
3 Id. § 3.
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height, unions represented about 35% of that group.4 This Essay will
deal, however, not with the EFCA but with another controversial, if
less publicized, proposal: the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA). The
AFA would have a much broader impact than the EFCA. It could
affect the whole of the nonunion work force, currently about 92.8% of
6
private-sector employment. It would amend the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)7 to prohibit most pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment claims or civil rights claims. Some background is
necessary to understand what is at stake.
THE PROBLEM

Suppose you are a blue-collar or pink-collar employee, used to
making $15 an hour, a trifle more than twice the federal minimum
wage, or some $30,000 a year, which amounts to about 75% of the
national average individual income.8 You have been laid off during
the current recession and have been actively seeking work for a
couple of months. You hear of a job paying $12.50 an hour, a step
down but far better than nothing. You apply and are accepted. The
personnel director presents you with the usual set of forms to fill out,
plus one that states: "All disputes between the Company and the
Employee arising out of this employment relationship, including
statutory claims, shall be resolved through the arbitration system
established by the Company, and the Employee waives all right to
bring any action on such claims against the Company in federal or
state court." If you have the effrontery to inquire what happens if you
do not agree to this, you will be told curtly, "You do not get the job."
So you sign. Later you are discharged, supposedly for inadequate
performance, but you are convinced it is because of your age, race, or
sex. Can you sue? If you do, can the Company demand that you
arbitrate instead?
THE PRESENT LEGAL ANSWER

In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that an individual stockbroker employee was bound by a
4

See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR

STATISTICS 1978, at 507 tbl.150 (1979) (illustrating that 1954 was the year of highest union
representation).
5 S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
6

See

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, RELEASE NO. USDL

10-0069, UNION MEMBERS IN2009, at 1 (2010).

7 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).

8 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.

9 500U.S.20(1991).
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contract with the New York Stock Exchange to arbitrate a claim of
age discrimination against his employer.' 0 The stockbroker was not
precluded, however, from filing a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC); only his own court action was
barred." The Court also emphasized that the stockbroker had suffered
no loss of substantive rights; it was only a change of forum.12
Moreover, the agreement in Gilmer plainly authorized the arbitrator
to handle statutory claims as well as contractual claims." The arbitral
procedures simply had to be such that they did not impair the
employee's capacity to vindicate his statutory rights.14 How did this
notion of substituting private arbitration for statutorily authorized
court suits ever arise?
DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
During the 1980s, a series of court decisions, which would
eventually include all but a few states, imposed significant
qualifications on the traditional American common-law doctrine of
"employment at will."' 5 The exceptions were based on such theories
10Id. at 23.
1 See id. at 28. The Court has since held that an individual's agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes does not prevent the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief in court,
including reinstatement, back pay, and damages. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 285-88 (2002). The EEOC does not have the resources, however, to litigate all meritorious
cases and must leave many to the charging parties to pursue on their own. See, e.g., Maurice E.
R. Munroe, The EEOC: Patternand PracticeImperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 219 (1995)
(arguing that none of the EEOC's strategies have been effective in fighting discrimination or in
processing individual charges).
12 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-28.
13 See id. at 23, 26.
4 See id. at 28, 30-32. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court held an arbitrator's adverse
decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not prevent a black employee from
pursuing his claim in court that his discharge was racially discriminatory in violation of
Title Vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). See Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974). There the Court concluded that, unlike in
Gilmer, the arbitrator was not authorized to deal with statutory claims. See id. at 53-54. Gilmer,
however, noted that Gardner-Denver involved a "tension" between union representation and
individual statutory rights. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. More recently, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129
S. Ct. 1456 (U.S. 2009), the Supreme Court held, in a sharply divided five-to-four decision, that
employers could enforce a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and
unmistakably required employees to arbitrate statutory age discrimination claims. See id. at
1474.
5 State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51 to :52 (Feb. 10, 2009)
(illustrating that Florida, Louisiana and Rhode Island were the holdouts). Under the
at-will employment doctrine, employers may lawfully "dismiss their employes [sic] at will,....
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong." Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527
(1915); see also H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-74

(1877) ("Where a person is employed at a yearly salary, at the option of the employer as to the
duration of service, the contract creates a mere hiring at will, which may be put an end to by the
master at any time, . . .").

HeinOnline -- 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 631 2009-2010

632

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

as public policy (a tort),' 6 express or implied contract (oral promises
or personnel manuals)," and, much less often, the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.18 Judges and juries awarded substantial
damages to employees who were found to be victims of wrongful
discharge. For example, several studies showed that plaintiffs in
California won about 75% of the discharge cases that went to
juries, with the average award being around $450,000.19 Nationwide,
individual wrongful discharge plaintiffs received jury awards for
actual and punitive damages as high as $20 million, $4.7 million,
$3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million, and $1.5 million. 2 0 Even
16 See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-37 (Cal. 1980) (holding
that an employee who was allegedly fired for refusing to join a price-fixing conspiracy could
maintain a tort action for wrongful discharge against his employer); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (holding that a quality-control manager's allegation
that he was fired for insisting that the employer comply with state law was sufficient for a cause
of action in tort for wrongful discharge); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,
879-80 (I. 1981) (holding that Palmateer had stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
by alleging that he was fired for informing law enforcement that a coworker might be violating
the law and for agreeing to gather further evidence implicating that coworker). But see, e.g.,
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to recognize
a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee).
" See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-28 (Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that a wrongful termination action could be based on the violation of the employer's
implied promise not to act arbitrarily toward the employee, which was evidenced by the totality
of the parties' relationship, including the fact that the employee had worked for the employer for
thirty-two years); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich.
1980) (holding that the plaintiffs allegations were sufficient for a jury to find that their
employers had orally agreed to fire them only for cause, even though the term of their
employment was indefinite); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J.
1985) (holding that a jury could find that termination policies printed in the employer's
personnel manual constituted an enforceable implied promise to fire employees only for cause),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y.
1982) (holding that employee pleaded a recognizable cause of action for breach of contract
where he was allegedly discharged without just cause and the employer failed to follow the
rehabilitative efforts specified in the personnel handbook).
18 See, e.g., Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th
Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law and holding that, without a finding of bad faith, an at-will
employee generally may be fired for any or no reason); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 398-99 (Cal. 1988) (recognizing solely contractual remedies for a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of employment termination);
Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the
requirement of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment contracts). But see,
e.g., Am. Home Prods.Corp., 448 N.E.2d at 91 (holding that there is no implied requirement of
good faith and fair dealing in the context of at-will employment contracts).
'9 See JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF

WRONGFUL TERMINATION 24-26, 33-37 (1988) (discussing trial outcomes of California jury
cases from the 1980s and post-trial adjustments to those jury verdicts); Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful
Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 MICH. B.J. 776, 776 (1983) (discussing a
1982 study of California discharge cases that went to juries, which showed that 90% resulted in
plaintiff verdicts, with the average verdict being $450,000); California Wrongful Discharge
Verdicts Averaged $424,527 in 1986 Jury Trials, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Feb. 24, 1987).
20 Kenneth T. Lopatka & Julia A. Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful
Discharge, in ABA Div. FOR PROF'L EDUC.,

LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND
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winning was not cost-free for business. By the end of the 1980s, the
fees and expenses for a successful defense of a discharge case before
a jury could range between $100,000 and $150,000 in major
midwestern cities, and amount to around $200,000 on the coasts.2'
Many employers reacted to the new causes of action and costly
litigation by imposing so-called "mandatory arbitration," conditioning
employment on a worker's agreement to arbitrate all job disputes with
the employer rather than taking them to court. The mandatory
arbitration was meant to apply even to claims arising under federal
or state civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination against
employees because of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, age, disability,
and so on.22 Mandatory arbitration plainly raises numerous legal and
policy questions. That is especially true with regard to attempts to
prevent plaintiffs from resorting to the courts for the vindication of
statutory rights.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MANDATORY ARBITRATION

One can easily imagine the arguments against mandatory
arbitration, and they are most appealing on their face. For example,
Congress, or some other legislative body, has prohibited various types
of employment discrimination and has prescribed certain procedures
for the enforcement of those rights. In a given case, the specified
procedures, sometimes including the right to a jury trial, may be
almost as important as the substantive rights. No employer should be
able to force an employee to waive the statutorily provided forum,
procedures, and remedies as the price for getting or keeping a job.
Conditioning employment on the surrender of statutory entitlements
would seem a blatant affront to public policy.
An employer dealing with an individual employee, opponents
contend, is the "repeat player" against the one-timer, and arbitrators
may be affected by knowing who the much likelier source of future

INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS, at vii, 13-18 (1986).
21 Figures are based on conversations between the author and management attorneys at the
1992 Midwinter Meeting of the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section's Committee on
Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Workplace on April 8-9, 1992.
22See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12201-12213 (2006). A number of state
statutes and municipal ordinances extend the protected categories beyond the federal coverage.
Thus, employment discrimination may be prohibited because of marital status, sexual
orientation, gender identity, HIV or AIDS, and genetic testing. See Comparison Chart of State
FEP Lws, 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 451:51 to :53 (July 13, 2009);
State Fair Employment Practice Lws, 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual)
451:1 to:5 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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business is.23 Some sizable, well-publicized jury verdicts could do
considerably more, it is said, to deter workplace discrimination
than any number of smaller, confidential arbitration awards.24 An
employer's provision for arbitration is arguably a not-so-subtle
antiunion device, because a grievance and arbitration system is
regarded as one of the principal benefits of unionization and
collective bargaining. For these and other reasons, several scholars,
two federal agencies, and two prestigious private bodies have gone on
the record as opposing mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
claims.25

23 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat PlayerEffect, 1 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
24See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 429-31 (1996) (arguing that the
private nature of arbitration and the incentives for the arbitrator to favor the employer strip
arbitration of the deterrent value associated with remedial statutes). Arbitral awards are
customarily not published unless all parties consent. But many decisions are published by the
American Arbitration Association, the Bureau of National Affairs, and Commerce Clearing
House.
25 See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (arguing that
diversion of employment discrimination disputes to arbitration "threatens the effective
implementation of antidiscrimination policy, and poses serious questions of fairness to
individual claimants"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L.
REv. 33, 37 (arguing that substituting arbitration for adjudication reduces the legal liability of
corporate defendants); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020
(1996) (arguing that the trend toward mandatory arbitration could deprive workers of their
statutory rights altogether); EEOC: Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 405:7301 to :7303 (Feb. 1997) (stating that ADR programs in
EEOC field offices should ensure fairness, which should be indicated by voluntariness,
neutrality, confidentiality, and enforceability). In July 1997, the EEOC issued a longer and even
stronger condemnation of compulsory arbitration and pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate,
declaring that "even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial system."
EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 405:7511, 405:7520 (July
1997). According to the court in Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
the NLRB General Counsel has been prepared to issue unfair labor practice complaints
on the issue. Id. at 1479 n.6; see also COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT.

RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION]

(recommending that employers be forbidden from requiring employees to agree to arbitrate
public-law claims as a condition of employment); NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS,
ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL

MEETING 312 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998) ("The National Academy of Arbitrators opposes
mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of employment when it requires waiver of
direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights."). The
NAA softened its opposition somewhat on May 20, 2009, stating that "voluntary arbitration is
always preferable, and that it is desirable for employees to be allowed to opt freely,
post-dispute, for either the courts and administrative tribunals or arbitration." See Nat'l Acad. of
Arbitrators, Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration (May 20, 2009), www.naarb.org/due
-process/duecprocess.html.
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These arguments against mandatory arbitration are impressive,
but they are not dispositive. One study, for example, indicates that
the greater success of the repeat player is simply the result of
employer experience, not arbitrator bias.2 6 Any repeat-player
advantage that may exist will diminish with the increasing growth of
a plaintiffs-claimants bar. The deterrent effect of some large jury
verdicts may well be assumed, and yet it is widely thought that the
certainty of sanctions is more of a deterrent than their severity.27 The
history recounted above indicates that employers' resort to mandatory
arbitration in the 1980s was triggered far more by the size of jury
verdicts and the cost of litigation than by efforts to stymie union
organization.28 Concerns that private arbitration will hinder the
development of judicial doctrine in the civil rights area seem
ill-founded in light of the very large federal caseload dealing with
employment discrimination. 29
Post-dispute arbitration agreements are undoubtedly fairer to
workers than mandatory, pre-dispute agreements. As in my
hypothetical of the laid-off worker seeking a new job, pre-dispute
agreements are usually executed when employees are predisposed to
sign any document placed before them. The post-dispute agreement is
more likely to be truly voluntary, since it is entered into when the
relevant facts are mostly known, and the employee can make an
informed judgment about whether to arbitrate or go to court. 30 If a
worker has been discharged, he or she has little or nothing to lose by
refusing to go along with an employer's offer of arbitration.
Yet the attractiveness of the post-dispute agreement to arbitrate
may be mostly a chimera. Management representatives testified
before the Dunlop Commission that employers would generally not
26 See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1571
(2005).
27 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargainingand Sentencing After Booker,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 731 (2005) (stating, in the context of white-collar sentencing,
that "reduced predictability might undercut general deterrence"); Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 380 (1997) (observing that, for
criminal punishment, "certainty of conviction plays a much bigger role in discouraging all
manner of crime than does the severity of punishment").
28 Except for a short-lived spurt during the Korean War, union density had been in steady
decline since 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed. See sources cited supranotes 4 & 6.
29 Filings of civil rights employment claims in federal court averaged about 15,500 cases a
year from 2004 through 2008. That is about twice the average total of cases under all labor laws,
excluding ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act). See ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 147-48 tbl.C-2A (2009), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/jud
bus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
30 See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF
COMMERCE AND LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (1994).
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be willing to enter into such arrangements. 3 1 Employers will wait out
most smaller claims, knowing that employees will usually not be able
find a lawyer to bring suit. Conversely, employees and their lawyers
are unlikely to agree to arbitrate the big case rather than take it before
a judge and jury. As a result, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate,
when no one knows what the future holds, may be the most sensible
course for both parties.32 In my mind that gets to the core of this
long-running debate. Employers generally believe they are better off
with arbitration than with costly court suits before emotionally
aroused juries. What about our ordinary rank-and-file worker with a
relatively small monetary claim but with a job and its related benefits
at stake? What better serves him or her in actual operation: a
mandatory arbitration system, with its admitted defects, or the
statutorily provided access to federal or state court? Here, facts speak
louder than abstract theories, and I believe we should listen.
ACCESS TO A TRIBUNAL

All the statutory (or contractual) rights in the world mean nothing
if they cannot be enforced. Both personal anecdote and more
systematic studies indicate that access to the courts will not be easy
for the usual lower-paid worker with an employment claim. One of
Detroit's leading employment lawyers told me his secretary kept
count. He agreed to represent one out of eighty-seven persons who
sought his services.33 The overall figures are not quite that dismal. At
a meeting of plaintiffs' attorneys, the estimate was that about 5% of
the individuals with an employment claim are able to obtain private
counsel.34 In what is perhaps the most comprehensive recent survey
of empirical studies of employment arbitration, Professor Alexander
Colvin declared that "one of the key potential advantages of
employment arbitration over litigation is that the relatively high costs
of litigation inhibit access to the courts by lower to mid-income
ranges [of] employees."35 Another study concluded that while most
31 See id. (noting that post-dispute arbitration is rarely agreed to because "the employer
and the employee each prefer to take quite different kinds of cases to court").
32 For an elaboration of this position, see Samuel Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over PredisputeEmployment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 559, 567-68 (2001).
33For a discussion of similar statistics by practitioners, see Lewis L. Maltby, Private
Justice: Employment Arbitrationand Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 58 (1998).
3 See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What
Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?,DisP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40,45;
Maltby, supranote 33, at 58.
35Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 419 (2007) (citing Estreicher, supra
note 32, at 559, 564-64, 567-68); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration
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employees below the $60,000 income level cannot get into court,
arbitration remains a realistic alternative.36 The last available U.S.
Census Bureau figures show the median income of all full-time,
year-round workers was $41,224.
Lewis Maltby, President of the National Work Rights Institute,
has long opposed mandatory arbitration.38 Yet at a spring 2007
conference sponsored by the National Academy of Arbitrators in
Chicago, he related an unhappy experience he had while director of
the ACLU's Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace. Many
persons approached him with stories of wrongful treatment in their
jobs. Although Maltby concluded that most of the cases were
unwinnable, he believed a couple dozen or so were deserving and
should be taken to court. He placed many calls asking lawyers for
assistance. Despite Maltby's expert prescreening of the claims, he
could find representation for only a single employee.39
Naturally, many, and maybe even most, of those who cannot
obtain legal representation will not have meritorious claims. But
others will be workers whose potential dollar recovery will simply not
justify the investment of the time and money of a first-rate lawyer
working on a contingent fee. For those individuals, the cheaper,
simpler process of arbitration is the most feasible recourse. It will cost
a lawyer far less time and effort to take a case to arbitration; at worst,
claimants can represent themselves or be represented by laypersons in
this much less formal and intimidating forum.
Individual employees with discrimination claims or contractual
claims will secure little help from the EEOC or small claims
court. The EEOC is so underfunded and understaffed that one
knowledgeable scholar has recommended, quite sensibly, that the
Commission get out of the business of handling individual charges,
and husband its limited resources for routing out systemic unlawful

and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44, 47 (discussing how middle and lower-income employees have less
access to the courts than higher-paid employees).
36 See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration:A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP.
RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 8, 10-11.
37 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey: 2008 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032008/perinc/new0l_028.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2010).
3 See Maltby, supra note 33, at 37 ("Allowing employers to make arbitration a condition
of employment is not only wrong in principle, it undermines due process as well.").
39 Lewis Maltby, Nat'l Work Rights Inst., Discussion at the National Academy of
Arbitrators 2007 Spring Educational Conference: Beyond the Due Process Protocol: The Future
of Due Process in Workplace Dispute Resolution (Apr. 13-14, 2007). The author attended this
conference.
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practices.40 At best, the Commission tends to concentrate on the big
case or the test case. Small claims courts will ordinarily not be an
answer either. They generally are authorized only to issue damage
awards in a limited amount, typically on the order of $5,000. Even
more important, they customarily do not exercise the equitable
jurisdiction to provide what may be most desired-an order restoring
the employee's job.
COMPARATIVE RESULTS IN ARBITRATION AND IN COURT

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. We now have the results
of several reputable empirical studies comparing employment cases in
arbitration and in the courts (when employees can get into court). It is
true that some early inquiries did not distinguish between higher-paid
employees, who had individually negotiated arbitration agreements,
and lower-paid workers subject to employer-imposed arbitration
systems. That exaggerated the employee success rate. Nonetheless,
the figures are enlightening and impressive. In one study, the
American Arbitration Association found a winning rate of 63% for
arbitral claimants. 41 Another study, conducted by the U.S. General
Accounting Office, found that in a much-criticized system operated
by the securities industry, employees still prevailed 55% of the time.42
By contrast, plaintiffs' success rates in separate surveys of federal
court and EEOC trials were only 14.9% and 16.8%, respectively.43
As might be expected, successful plaintiffs obtained larger awards
from judges or juries. But claimants as a group recovered more in
arbitration."
It is true that when more refined analyses took account of
differences between individually negotiated and employer-mandated
arbitration, the success rates varied significantly. In two separate
studies, Professor Lisa B. Bingham found that employees won 68.8%
and 61.3% of the claims based on individual contracts, but only
21.3% and 27.6% of the claims based on personnel manuals.45 A later
See Munroe, supranote 11, at 278-79.
Maltby, supra note 33, at 46.
42 Id. at 50; see also HOYT N. WHEELER, BRIAN S. KLAAS & DOUGLAS M. MAHONY,
WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS 48 (2004) (discussing the winning percentages for
employees in arbitration cases in the securities industry).
4 Maltby, supra note 33, at 46. Professor Wheeler and his colleagues found a 12%
employee win rate in federal district court, as contrasted with 33% in arbitration. WHEELER ET
AL., supra note 42, at 54 tbl.3.2.
44 See Maltby, supranote 33, at 54.
45 Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law,
Public Policy and Data, N.Z. J. INDUS. REL., June 1998, at 5, 16; Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon
Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that
4

41
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report on 200 American Arbitration Association arbitral awards from
1999 and 2000 showed an employee win rate of 34% in cases based
on employer-mandated plans as against an overall win rate of 43% for
all claims.46 But arbitration's superiority to, or at least its equivalence
with, court actions remained.
Professor Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill analyzed 215
American Arbitration Association cases resolved in the 1999 to
2000 period, 1430 federal court trials of that period, and 160 state
court trials from 1996.47 In non-civil rights employment disputes,
higher-paid employees (most likely operating under individual
contracts) won 64.9% of the arbitrations and lower-paid employees
(most likely operating under employer-promulgated plans) won
39.6%, while state court trials resulted in a 56.6% win rate for
plaintiffs, who were probably mostly higher-paid employees.48 In
civil-rights employment cases, the winning percentages in arbitrations
were 40.0% for higher-paid employees and 24.3% for lower-paid
employees, 43.8% for plaintiffs in state court trials, and 36.4% in
federal court trials.4 9 Especially if one assumes that most plaintiffs in
court actions were higher-paid employees, the differences in result
were negligible. Also significant, of the 215 arbitral resolutions, only
42, or 19.5%, dealt with employment discrimination claims.50 The
great majority dealt with claims based on individual contracts,
personnel manuals, and the like. This sharply reduces the argument
that arbitration, mandatory or otherwise, is having a deleterious effect
on the enforcement of civil rights legislation.
A final point is that pre-trial settlements may somewhat skew the
comparative figures between court judgments and arbitration awards.
Since employers win the vast majority of summary judgments in
federal court employment cases, and since employers naturally try to
buy out the stronger employee cases during preliminary proceedings
in litigation, decent arguments can be made either way about whether
trial results exaggerate or depress employee win rates, at least in
federal court. 5'

Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
46 Hill, supranote 36, at 11, 13.
47 See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 35, at 48 tbl.l.
48 Id. Employees earning less than $60,000 a year were classified as "lower-paid." Id. at

46.
49 Id. at 48 tbl.1.
50 Id. at 49.

s1 See Colvin, supra note 35, at 417-18. For a serious critique of the methodology in the
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Comparisons of employee win rates in employment arbitration
(generally nonunion) and traditional labor arbitration (between
unions and employers) are rare.5 2 Most disinterested observers would
probably regard the latter as the gold standard of arbitration. Yet
many persons (including me) would be surprised by the results of an
examination I made of the outcomes of 200 discharge arbitrations
filed from 1999 to 2007 in one of the country's oldest and most
respected union-management arbitration systems. The issue was
whether there was "just cause" or "proper cause" for the discharges
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Employees were
either reinstated or received other substantial relief in only 46
instances, or 23% of the 200 arbitrations.5 3 That is a lower winning
percentage than in all but one of the employment arbitration studies
previously discussed.
Insofar as a comparison between employee win rates in
employment arbitration and those in either court litigation or
traditional labor arbitration is any guide, it cannot be said that
mandatory arbitration in actual practice is detrimental to the
individual employee. For most lower-paid workers, it may in fact be
their only feasible option. Most important, then, is the accessibility
to the forum that any kind of arbitration, including mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration, offers such employees. After the initial
contrary outcry from scholarly critics, an increasing number of them
now seem more favorably disposed.54 Ironically, however, the former

foregoing empirical studies, see David S. Schwartz, MandatoryArbitration and Fairness, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1247 (2009). Professor Schwartz is seemingly opposed to empirical
studies in this area, apparently considering mandatory arbitration inherently "unfair," see id. at
1247, and thus offers no systematic figures of his own based on how it actually operates.
52 Comparisons of the way employment arbitrators and labor arbitrators treat hypothetical
scenarios, however, have been conducted. See Lisa B. Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision
Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671 (2000); Brian S. Klaas,
Douglas Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Decision-Making About Workplace Disputes: A
Policy-CapturingStudy of Employment Arbitrators,Labor Arbitrators,and Jurors, 45 INDuS.
REL. 68 (2006). Both studies found employment arbitrators significantly less likely to rule for
employees than labor arbitrators. But Bingham and Mesch found that the employment-labor
distinction was not statistically significant if the occupation of the arbitrator was taken into
account. Bingham & Mesch, supra, at 686. Attorney arbitrators were less favorable toward
employees than full-time arbitrators or professor-arbitrators. Id.
53The relatively low employee/union success rate is probably attributable to the
company's extensive experience with the type of discharges that will be upheld and the union's
willingness to let grievants have their "day in court." Earlier studies indicated that union
grievants generally won in whole or in part at least half the time in labor arbitrations. See, e.g.,
Bingham, supra note 45, at 10-11.
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration
Agreements, 13 LAB. LAW. 511 (1998) (examining the minimum requirements for enforceable
compulsory arbitration agreements and providing recommendations to the courts about what
such requirements should be); Samuel Estreicher, PredisputeAgreements to Arbitrate Statutory
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employer enthusiasm for mandatory arbitration may be waning, as
management recognizes the success employees have had under this
system. 5 At a recent meeting of labor and employment lawyers in
Michigan, I could not find a single top management attorney who was
currently advising clients to start or retain a mandatory arbitration
program. There were three reasons: (1) employees win too often;
(2) summary judgment is seldom available in arbitration; and (3) the
full right of appeal is also not available. Nonetheless, I still like to
think that arbitration, mandatory or otherwise, will turn out to be
a win-win situation. Employees, particularly those at the lower end
of the pay scale, will find readier access to effective relief, and
employers will find fewer devastating jury verdicts and lower
litigation costs.
DUE PROCESS IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION

For me, the critical problem in mandatory employment arbitration
is ensuring due process for the employees affected. In the mid-1990s,
both the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations and a broadly sponsored Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Employment, which drafted a Due Process Protocol,
produced very similar lists of necessary procedural guarantees in
employment arbitration.56 These included:
1. A jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law;
2. Simple, adequate discovery;

Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997) (concluding that arbitration is a proper
forum for the resolution of statutory employment claims); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on
Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 221 (1997) (arguing that mandatory arbitration
of statutory claims of unrepresented employees will not necessarily have a detrimental impact
on employee rights).
ss Cf Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 418-67 (2000)
(examining why mandatory arbitration creates disadvantages for both large and small
employers); Daniel B. Tukel, To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims: That Is
Now the Question for Michigan Employers, 79 MICH. B.J. 1206, 1207-08 (2000) (describing the
pros and cons of arbitration for employers).
56 See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 30-32; TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES (1995), reprinted in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM
534:401 to :402 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]. The Task Force consisted
of management, union, and plaintiffs' attorneys from the American Bar Association and the
National Employment Lawyers Association, as well as representatives of the American
Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra, at IERM 534:404.
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3. Cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality;5 7
4. Right to representation by a person of the employee's
choice;
5. Remedies equal to those provided by the law;
6. A written opinion and award, with reasons; and
7. Limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.
With a highly diverse membership, it is not surprising that the
Task Force that produced the Due Process Protocol was not able to
take a position on the acceptability of pre-dispute, as distinguished
from post-dispute, agreements to arbitrate-and thus effectively on
their "voluntariness,, 5 8-but it did agree they should be "knowingly
made." 59 In contrast, the more homogeneous Dunlop Commission
(consisting mostly of academics and neutral persons) could declare:
"[A]ny choice between available methods for enforcing statutory
employment rights should be left to the individual who feels wronged
rather than dictated by his or her employment contract."60
Significantly, however, Professor Paul Weiler, who served as counsel
to the Commission, told me he had reservations about this position on
the grounds that even mandatory arbitration provides employees with
access to relief they might not otherwise have when there is
employment wrongdoing. 6' The Commission itself suggested that this
issue should be revisited after there was more experience with
arbitration of employment claims. 62 My view is that experience has
shown that so-called "mandatory arbitration," if properly conducted,
can provide employees, especially lower-income workers, with a fair

s7 In Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court required
the employer to pay all the arbitrator's fees as a condition for enforcing an individual
employee's waiver of a judicial forum. Id. at 1468. Judge Harry Edwards, who spoke for the
2-1 majority, was surely correct that the source of payment is not the key to arbitrator
neutrality. See id. at 1485. Arbitrators are naturally concerned about getting their fee but
ordinarily not about where it comes from. Id. Individual employees, of course, may feel more
comfortable paying part of the arbitrator's fees, fearing that whoever pays the piper may also
call the tune. Cole may have gone too far, however, in insisting that the employer pay all of the
arbitrator's fee. See id. at 1484. Access to a court, at least initially, would normally not be costfree.
5s See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
5 See DuE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 56, at IERM 534:402.
6 DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 33.
61 Conversation with Paul Weiler, Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard
University (1995).
62 See id.
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hearing of their claims that they otherwise would not be able to
obtain.
Building on the work of the Dunlop Commission and the Due
Process Task Force, various groups and individuals have arrived at
something close to a consensus on the standards of fairness required
for legitimacy in mandatory arbitration. Major advances were made
by such scholars as Professors Richard A. Bales and Martin H. Malin
in papers presented at the 2007 conference sponsored by the National
Academy of Arbitrators on "Beyond the Protocol: The Future of Due
Process in Workplace Dispute Resolution." 63 Proposals for going
beyond the Protocol include prohibitions on: (1) bans on class actions
that would hinder employees in vindicating certain legitimate
interests (such as small monetary claims that would not be worth
individual pursuit); (2) shortening the applicable statutory limitations
period; (3) scheduling arbitration hearings at times or places that
would be inconvenient for employees or their representatives or
witnesses; and (4) charging arbitrator fees and expenses to employees
that would be greater than the filing fee required by the court where
an action would be brought on such a claim. Some courts have made
salutary advances in these directions, but there is still a long way to
go. 6
The National Academy of Arbitrators consists of about 630
leading labor arbitrators from the United States and Canada. In the
interests of preserving its neutrality, the Academy has had a
long-standing policy not to take "any official position on the question
of whether there should or should not be statutory regulation of
voluntary labor dispute arbitration, but that the Academy could,
consistently with this policy, indicate its judgment as to the desirable
content of regulatory statutes.",6 5 At its most recent national meeting
in October 2009, the Academy's Board of Governors accordingly
declined to express any opinion on whether the Arbitration Fairness
Act should or should not prohibit pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
63 See generally Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment
Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 301 (2007) (describing how the Due Process
Protocol could be updated to provide guidance to employers, courts, and arbitrators on a set of
rules designed to ensure arbitral fairness); Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment
Arbitration:The State of the Law and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 363 (2007) (analyzing the evolution of judicial policing of due process in employment
arbitration). See also Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration,
Guidelines for Employment Arbitration (May 20, 2009), http://www.naarb.org/due-process/due
process.html (promulgating guidelines aimed at ensuring procedural fairness in workplace
arbitrations).
( See, e.g., Bales, supra note 63, at 320-30, 335-37; Malin, supra note 63, at 386-96.

65 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, CRITICAL ISSUES
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING 201 (1957).

IN
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or other mandatory arbitration agreements.66 But the Board did
recommend that any legally permissible form of mandatory
arbitration should be required to include a comprehensive list of due
process protections for employees who are covered by it. The
Academy would expressly exclude from this regulation arbitration
provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements and
arbitration agreements that are individually and freely negotiated,
67
such as those with a national TV anchor or top business executive.
My personal view is that the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act
brings a hammer to bear on mandatory arbitration when the need is
for a scalpel. Total prohibition of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate,
or any other ban on agreements conditioning a job on an employee's
acceptance of arbitration instead of court actions to resolve
employment disputes, would satisfy some persons' sense of rightness
and would confirm their a priori approach to the problem. But it
would pose a major obstacle to the real-life fulfillment of the
purposes of antidiscrimination legislation for many, if not most, of the
intended beneficiaries. What is called for is not prohibition but a set
of statutory guarantees that these arbitration proceedings, however
initiated, will be conducted fairly and impartially.
CONCLUSION

For me, all of this ultimately comes down to a choice between a
noble but abstract principle (no one should be forced to forgo
sensitive statutory rights and procedures as the price for getting a job)
and certain harsh realities, namely, that most lower-paid workers
cannot gain access to those statutory procedures. Even the fortunate
few who do get into court generally do not fare significantly better
than the employees "compelled" to arbitrate. In such circumstances, I
go with the facts and let the theoretical principles be adjusted
accordingly. For all its apparent conceptual failings, mandatory
arbitration, subject to appropriate due process requirements, now
appears to be the most practical recourse for the ordinary
rank-and-file employee seeking to vindicate either a statutory or
contractual claim. I fervently hope that the Congress, and the
concerned public, will respond with that finding foremost in mind.
6 On October 13, 2009, Academy President William H. Holley, Jr., wrote Senator Russ
Feingold, who had introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act, setting forth the Academy's
position. A general press release followed on December 8, 2009. A copy of the press release,
including the Feingold letter and its attachments, is on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review.
67 The author chaired the committee reporting on this issue to the Academy's Board of
Governors.
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